I argued that Aristotle cannot consider the enkratēs (self-controlled person) and akratēs (person lacking self-control) to be different kinds of people. Instead, according to what he tells us, the difference between them can only be one of degree. Given the limited scope of akrasia proper, as well as the very specific epistemic failure of the akratēs, the akratēs is the enkratēs most of the time. As such, the akratēs is the same kind of person as the enkratēs. This means that healing morally bad character is easier than it is usually thought to be, even on Aristotle’s account.
Dissertation Abstract
Presentations:
“The Uncanny Valley of Horror.”
Aesthetic Education and Screen Stories. University of Rijeka. September 2023.
“How to Be Honest about Things We Dislike.”
Long Island Philosophical Society. Saint John's University. April 2023.
“Aristotle on Melancholia: The Discovery of Bipolar Depression.”
Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. Louisville, Kentucky. March 2023.
“An Aristotelian Defense of Violent Video Games.”
Video Games and Ethics Conference. Florida Atlantic University. February 2023.
“The Uncanny Valley of Horror.”
Florida Philosophical Association. New College of Florida. February 2023.
“Aristotle on Melancholia: The Discovery of Bipolar Depression.”
Fuge of Melancholy. Pedagogical University of Krakow (Online). November 2022.
“The Uncanny Valley of Horror.”
Illinois Philosophical Society. Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville. November 2022.
“Healing Akrasia and Vice”
Long Island Philosophical Society. Molloy College. April 2022.